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“Zoned for Residential Uses”—Like Prayer?
Home Worship and Municipal Opposition
in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In seventeenth-century Europe, small clusters of believers gathered in their homes to worship according to their minority faith.
When persecution drove them from those homes, these Pilgrims
sought the freedom to pray in America. Today, a cluster of Orthodox Jews in southern New York state, led by Rabbi Yitzchok
LeBlanc-Sternberg, are battling for the right to worship in their
homes against hostile neighbors who have attempted to drive them
out through zoning restrictions on their religion. This Note will examine the contours of this decade-long legal controversy in New
York and its impact on Free Exercise jurisprudence in the land use
context.
Despite the abundance of scholarship on the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause, how Free Exercise claims
actually fare in lower courts has received scant attention.2 By assessing the lifecycle of this case, this Note examines how Free Exercise
principles play out in resolving a religious land use dispute. Part II
provides background on modern Free Exercise jurisprudence and
particularly its clash with land use regulation, including restrictions
on home worship. Part III describes the facts and reasoning of the
Second Circuit’s three rulings in the LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher

1. This controversy reached the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
three times, each time entitled LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher. See 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995);
No. 96-6149, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31,800 at *6. (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1996); 143 F.3d 748 (2d
Cir. 1998).
The author wishes to thank Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr. for his mentorship and
his inspiring dedication to the cause of religious liberty; Dean Kevin Worthen and Professor
Frederick M. Gedicks for their thoughtful feedback and valuable perspectives; and Hannah
Clayson Smith for illuminating my life and the law as my wife, classmate, and chief co-counsel.
The author bears full and sole responsibility for any errors in this Note.
2. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (1992).
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controversy. Part IV assesses the court’s holdings, analyzes their impact, and recommends improvements for protecting Free Exercise
rights in zoning disputes. Part V concludes that the Fletcher precedents, particularly their narrowing of governmental discretion in
zoning, modestly and properly raise the level of legal protection for
religious exercise.
II. BACKGROUND ON ZONING AND RELIGION
The First Amendment’s religion clauses champion two of our nation’s treasured principles. This case concerns the Free Exercise
Clause: “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”3 What the Constitution leaves unsaid frames the
debate on religious land use: (1) what scope of Free Exercise does
the Constitution mandate, and (2) how does a court balance a religious congregation’s liberty and property rights against the larger
community’s interests? Religious land use jurisprudence has long
sought to appropriately weigh these fundamental values of our Constitution and our people.
A. Modern Judicial Approach to Free Exercise
In 1963, the Supreme Court set the standard for modern Free
Exercise jurisprudence in Sherbert v. Verner.4 The Court in Sherbert
created a test to balance state action against its burden on religious
exercise. In essence, state action was constitutional only if it survived
strict scrutiny—that is, if it both advanced a compelling state interest
and employed the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.
This standard placed a heavy burden of proof upon a governmental
actor to justify the burdens its actions placed on religious exercise.
But in 1990, the landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith 5
abandoned that standard in dramatic fashion.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See 374 U.S. 398 (1963). This case involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired
because she would not work on Saturday, her faith’s day of rest. When she applied for state
unemployment benefits, she was disqualified for the same reason. The Court found that no
compelling state interest justified a denial of benefits for her religious observance.
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1989), reh’g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). As in Sherbert, at issue
was the denial of unemployment benefits. The two plaintiffs, as part of the religious ceremony
of the Native American Church, ingested a narcotic (peyote) that violated the state’s drug laws,
causing them to be fired for misconduct and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation.
The Court upheld the denial of benefits.
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In Smith, the Court lowered the standard to a very permissive
and deferential one, akin to mere rational basis review.6 According to
Smith, any valid neutral law of general applicability need not be justified even if it burdens religious exercise. The Court downplayed its
prior strict-scrutiny rulings as falling within a hybrid rights exception.
If some other First Amendment right was implicated along with the
Free Exercise claim, then the strict-scrutiny standard would still apply.7 In sum, Smith seemed to sweep away the special protection religion had enjoyed.
In 1993, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,8 the Supreme Court articulated an important limitation on
the Smith doctrine by elaborating on what constituted a neutral law
of general applicability. The Court invalidated a city ordinance burdening religious exercise, even though it was neutral and generally
applicable on its face. Without disturbing Smith’s holding that incidental burdens on religion need not be justified, the Court reasoned
that the “Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”9 While the ordinance seemed
neutral on its face, the majority zeroed in on the ordinance’s intended effects. The record revealed a clear discriminatory purpose—
to suppress an unpopular religious practice of a certain minority
church.10 Thus, “facial neutrality alone was not sufficient to escape
rigorous scrutiny.”11 Three concurring justices urged re-examination
or rejection of Smith as a serious misreading of the Constitution.12
This examination of legislative purpose may significantly narrow the
scope of what constitutes a neutral law.
The alarmed proponents of religious liberty have struggled since
Smith to overturn its apparent demotion of religion as undeserving

6. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
7. See id. at 881.
8. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
9. Id. at 534.
10. The city ordinance ostensibly regulated the ritual killing of animals. But with
exemptions for Kosher slaughter, the record clearly established a single target: banning the
ceremonial animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion, whose theology fuses Catholicism and
African tradition.
11. Kenneth Pearlman & Stuart Meck, Land Use Controls and RFRA: Analysis and Predictions, 2 NEXUS J. OPINION 127, 129 (1997).
12. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 578 (Blackmun &
O’Connor, JJ., concurring).
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of special protection under the Constitution.13 Their efforts so far
have been largely frustrated.14 By 1993, “a remarkable groundswell
of opposition [to Smith] from religious and civil liberties groups
across the political spectrum”15 successfully urged Congress to enact
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by sizeable margins.16 The Act attempted to turn back the clock legislatively: it overturned Smith and restored the Sherbert test to Free Exercise jurisprudence.17 RFRA declared the following test for Free Exercise claims:
(1) Does the state regulation substantially burden religious practice?
(2) Does the regulation advance a compelling state interest? (3) Is
the regulation the least restrictive means of advancing that compelling interest?18 In effect, any state regulation that “substantially burdened” religious exercise would be invalid, unless a compelling governmental interest justified the burden and the regulation was the
least restrictive means of achieving that goal.
However, at its first opportunity, the Supreme Court struck
down RFRA as unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores19 in 1997.
In this one case converged “two of the most important and contested issues of modern constitutional law[:]” the scope of Free Exercise, and “the relationship between congressional and judicial authority in interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights.”20 The
facts of Boerne centered on religious land use regulation, but the majority never reached that issue.21 Instead of providing “guidance on
religion and land use, the Court treated the case as ‘Marbury v.
Madison: The Sequel,’”22 focusing on whether Congress had the
constitutional authority to enact RFRA. The Court ruled that Congress did not. By seeking to define the scope of Free Exercise, it had

13. See infra notes 15-18, 27-30 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
15. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159 (1997).
16. See id. at 160.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1999).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1999).
19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20. McConnell, supra note 15, at 153.
21. In Boerne, a growing Catholic congregation wished to renovate all but the facade of
its officially landmarked, historic structure. The church claimed exemption under RFRA from
the city’s preservation ordinance, which prohibited the proposed renovation. See Boerne, 521
U.S. at 511.
22. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 131.
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exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.23 The majority struck down RFRA’s standard of judicial strict-scrutiny review of state and local governmental practices.24
But Boerne contained a caveat critical to religious land use: Congress
does have authority to legislate remedies (to protect religious exercise) if it has “reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the
congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.”25 For reasons discussed below, zoning laws, like
those at issue in Fletcher, may qualify as precisely such a category of
laws, thereby justifying congressional regulation.26
RFRA’s advocates, humbled by Boerne, have since regrouped behind a more narrowly tailored alternative: the proposed Religious
Liberty Protection Act (“RLPA”), which is still before Congress.27
The RLPA bill rectifies RFRA’s exposed weaknesses by invoking
firmer grounds for its authority.28 It is backed by findings, including
“a massive record of individualized assessment of land use plans, of
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places of assembly, and of discrimination against small and unfamiliar denominations as compared to larger and more familiar ones.”29 According
to the caveat in Boerne, this record of actual discrimination improves

23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
24. See Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 633 (1998). The opinion did not explicitly
invalidate “RFRA insofar as it applies to federal laws and practices.” See id. at n.5. But because
state and local—not federal—regulations predominate in Free Exercise cases, and especially in
the land use context, this possibly surviving remnant of RFRA is not very significant and beyond the scope of this Note.
25. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
26. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.C.1.
27. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
28. RLPA derives its authority from the Commerce and Spending Clauses, not the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1998).
According to one scholar, RLPA’s invocation of the Spending Clause “is an utterly routine
exercise of authority under the Spending Power,” and the Commerce Power is also appropriate
as “our Constitution’s means of demarcating the federal from the state spheres of regulation.”
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, June 23, 1998 (statement of Michael McConnell, Professor, University of Utah Law
School), available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter McConnell Statement].
29. Legislation to Protect Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 9, 1999 (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of Texas Law
School) available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter Laycock 1999 Senate
Statement].
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the likelihood that RLPA would be found constitutional. Lastly,
RLPA “is not subject to the separation of powers objections that ultimately doomed RFRA.”30
B. Land Use Regulation and Free Exercise
The interests of land use regulation and religious exercise clash in
what is still an open-ended debate in the courts. Traditionally a local
issue, zoning disputes began to spill over into federal courts after the
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.31 ruled that
zoning ordinances are constitutional unless they are “clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.”32 When deciding if zoning ordinances burden religious exercise, lower courts have diverged in their
decisions, in part because “unlike other aspects of the First Amendment where the federal courts have given substantial guidance, decisions on religion and land use have more often come at the state
level and state practice varies widely.”33 To date, the Supreme Court
has never provided direct guidance on how to evaluate Free Exercise
claims—including those stemming from home worship—in the land
use context.34
The extent to which the Smith doctrine applies to land use regulation is unclear.35 Because it only applies to neutral rules of general
applicability, it may not even reach land use laws. The key determination (not yet resolved by the courts) is whether zoning laws impacting religious institutions are “of general applicability or involve particularized determinations for a single site.”36 If generally applicable,
then the Smith doctrine will most likely apply. But strong evidence
suggests that zoning decisions are particularized determinations.
Zoning ordinances are fraught “with exemptions and discretionary
30. McConnell Statement, supra note 28. RLPA avoids confrontation by accepting the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. It merely adds federal statutory
protection for religion, just as certain environmental and disability laws are promoted to the
maximum constitutional extent of federal power, but are not themselves constitutional rights.
31. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. Id. at 395 (citation omitted).
33. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 128.
34. See Ann Wehener, When a House Is Not a Home but a Church: A Proposal for Protection of Home Worship from Zoning Ordinances, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 491, 493 (1993).
35. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 167 (enumerating situations in which Smith does
not apply and strict scrutiny for Free Exercise claims does).
36. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 134.
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mechanisms” that lead to “highly individualized solutions to land
use issues.”37 Though most zoning ordinances are enacted by legislative bodies (i.e., a city council), “many consider these actions to be
administrative in nature” because (unelected) planning commissions
so profoundly shape these ordinances.38 For example, zoning bodies
have discretion to place conditions on permits, to retain on-going
review, and to grant exemptions and variances.39 Because “[l]and use
regulation is among the most individualized and least generally applicable bodies of law in our legal system,”40 it is vulnerable to arguments that zoning decisions challenged by Free Exercise claims
should receive strict judicial scrutiny.
A majority of courts recognize that places of worship enjoy a
special status, but “none has gone so far as to claim all zoning ordinances that affect churches are impermissible.”41 In these jurisdictions, “churches are presumed to contribute to the general welfare
and morals of the surrounding community” and offer “an inherently
beneficial quality” that presumptively or conclusively weighs in their
favor.42 New York has a history of affirmative protection of religious
liberty, robustly interpreting the scope of Free Exercise.43 Similarly,
Indiana, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, and Washington have given
special consideration to religious interests in zoning disputes.44
By contrast, a minority of states “are highly deferential to municipal decisions”45 that inhibit places of worship, as long as the or-

37. ANGELA C. CARMELLA, Land Use Regulation of Churches, in THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN CHURCHES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL STRUCTURES ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Craig Mousin ed., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 11, on file with
author).
38. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 134.
39. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 11.
40. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
755, 767 (1999).
41. Wehener, supra note 34, at 495.
42. Angela C. Carmella, Liberty and Equality: Paradigms for the Protection of Religious
Property Use, 37 J. CHURCH & ST. 573, 592 (1995).
43. See Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968); Jewish
Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1975).
44. See Milharcic v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 489 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986); Beit Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 418 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1979); Lubavitch Chabad
House v. City of Evanston, 445 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992
(1983); Libis v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 292 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982).
45. Carmella, supra note 42, at 593.
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dinances bear “substantial relation to promoting the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.”46 California and Florida, for example, defer to municipal bodies that exclude churches if an alternative location exists.47 “[T]hese courts seldom [uphold] a free exercise
challenge, reasoning that economic burdens on religious freedom do
not rise to a constitutionally impermissible infringement.”48 They do
not perceive the building of a church “as a fundamental tenet of a
congregation’s beliefs” and thus a denial does not constitute a “substantial” burden.49
C. Land Use Regulation and Home Worship
As a subset of religious land use issues, home worship raises all
the important questions in a context closer to home.50 One might
suppose that home worship, because of its inherently private location
and nature, would remain safely impervious to the tentacles of zoning regulations. According to one court, “Nothing can be more
deeply personal than [a person’s] desire to worship in the manner at
issue here. He is at home. He is in prayer. He is with friends. He is
entitled to be left alone.”51 However, courts differ in their view of
the proper level of protection for individuals who gather in homes
for religious purposes. One tendency emerges: “the larger and more
public the assembly . . . , the more vulnerable the activity is to municipal restriction.”52
Only three home worship cases have elicited rulings from federal
courts of appeals.53 In Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San
46. Wehener, supra note 34, at 495-96.
47. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 18.
48. Wehener, supra note 34, at 496. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(causing religious observance to become economically disadvantageous did not impermissibly
burden Free Exercise).
49. Wehener, supra note 34, at 496.
50. In this Note, “home worship” refers only to collective religious exercise in a residence by a group that includes non-residents. Though beyond the scope of this Note, home
worship by residents also raises interesting legal issues. Who is a “resident” and how do zoning
officials define household composition and family? While “[m]ost codes accommodate religious persons who seek to live together in a residence but who are not a ‘family,’” e.g., nuns in
a convent, “many living arrangements do not meet these specially defined uses, and the question continues to be litigated.” Carmella, supra note 42, at 589 n.39.
51. State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217, 1228 (N.J. 1985).
52. Carmella, supra note 42, at 589.
53. Another home worship case, decided on the grounds of vagueness and thus never
reaching the Free Exercise claim, is Nichols v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of
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Francisco,54 the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of a conditional use
permit for a church that wished to move its worship meetings into a
residential home. The congregation had been meeting in a rented
hotel banquet room. Short of claiming a religious “need” to relocate, the church explained why worshipping in a home was important to them. It was motivated by both doctrine (the Second Coming’s imminence obviated the building of nonresidential structures)
and practical considerations (independence from commercial establishments saves money and enhances flexibility).55 The court declined
to invalidate the city’s permit denial. It reasoned that the denial did
not restrict any current exercise of religion, and restricting only a desired future change in that exercise was not a sufficiently substantial
burden.56
In Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,57 the Eleventh Circuit similarly
upheld a city ordinance that enjoined Rabbi Armin Grosz from conducting prayers with fellow Orthodox Jews in his garage in Miami.
The tenets of Orthodox Judaism require a quorum (“minyan”) in
order to conduct worship services. This sets Orthodox Jews apart as
a particularly sympathetic subset of home-worshipping plaintiffs:
their doctrine compels the gathering of a certain minimum of members.58 Nevertheless, the court found that that the city’s zoning interests outweighed the burden on the congregants’ Free Exercise interest.59 It reasoned that the availability of a Jewish temple nearby
made this burden on religion permissible, despite the congregants’
belief that worship in this rabbi’s home was more effective.60
RFRA reversed Rabbi Grosz’s fortunes.61 In 1996, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that, while its first ruling found the governmental
interest did outweigh the burden on religion, RFRA now mandated

Stratford, 667 F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1987).
54. 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1991).
55. See id. at 1224.
56. See id.
57. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
58. This requirement for a quorum (or “minyan”) comes from the Jewish Talmud (a
sacred code of religious practice) and figures prominently in this Note’s lead case, as discussed
below. A minyan consists of at least ten observant males age thirteen or older.
59. See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741.
60. See id. at 739. Rabbi Grosz defied the court’s order to cease his prayers, finding the
court no more persuasive than the Nazi persecution he had survived.
61. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 82 F.3d 1005 (11th Cir. 1996).
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a different inquiry: did the ordinance substantially burden religion?62
The court ruled that it did, thus triggering strict scrutiny and invalidation of the ordinance. Since RFRA’s demise, this controversy’s
resolution is again uncertain.
To summarize, Free Exercise claimants must first demonstrate
that the challenged state action imposes “a substantial burden on religious exercise,” but this initial showing “has historically been a
problem for home worshippers.”63 Courts handling suits brought by
advocates of home worship “have focused on whether the effect on
religion is incidental or substantial.”64 Because “[e]conomic hardship
has not sufficed as a substantial burden” and alternative locations are
usually (at least theoretically) available, courts seem “reluctant to
find burdens on religion when home worship is involved.”65 Nevertheless, in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher,66 the third home worship
case to reach a federal court of appeals, the court reached a dramatically different conclusion.
III. THE LEBLANC-STERNBERG V. FLETCHER CONTROVERSY
The legal struggle between the Orthodox Jews and certain residents of Ramapo, New York, spans a decade.67 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has issued three rulings (Fletcher I, II, and III) on
different aspects of the case, most recently in May 1998.68 All three
have favored the religious liberty interests of the Jewish plaintiffs.
The remainder of this Note will summarize the Second Circuit’s
62. Id. at 1007.
63. Wehener, supra note 34, at 506. Thus, even the liberty-oriented RFRA regime provided only limited assistance to home worship claims. RFRA supported free exercise claims by
requiring a compelling governmental interest to outweigh the substantial burden. Home worshippers struggle to establish the burden itself as substantial. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights
Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 946
(1989) (exploring the distinction between permissible and impermissible burdens).
64. Wehener, supra note 34, at 497. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens
on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996) (arguing that even incidental burdens on rights should be subject to some form of heightened scrutiny).
65. Wehener, supra note 34, at 502.
66. 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995).
67. The plaintiffs filed their original complaint in 1991, which matured into LeBlancSternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995).
68. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Fletcher
I]; LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, No. 96-6149, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31800, at *6. (2d
Cir. Dec. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Fletcher II]; LeBlanc-Strenberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748 (2d
Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Fletcher III].
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three rulings and assess their aggregate impact on Free Exercise and
home worship in land use disputes.
A. Round One: Free Exercise Rights Vindicated
1. The facts
The Town of Ramapo, New York, is a large area that embraces
both incorporated villages and unincorporated sections.69 A significant influx of Orthodox Jewry, including members of its Hasidic
subgroup, settled in the unincorporated Airmont section of Ramapo
during the 1980s.
a. Religious needs of the new Orthodox neighbors. The strict religious observance of Orthodox Jews mandates certain conditions for
worship services. Central religious practices, such as reciting certain
prayers and reading from the Torah, require a quorum (“minyan”)
of at least ten men over the age of thirteen. Observing the familiar
commandment to “rest” on the Sabbath, Jewish law forbids the use
of vehicular transportation and circumscribes the area a believer can
travel on the Sabbath and holidays. Thus, for Orthodox Jews to exercise their religion, they must “be able to gather for worship in congregations large enough to ensure the presence of a minyan, and
close enough to the congregants’ homes to allow them to walk to
services.”70
These religious strictures made ordinary, free-standing houses of
worship impractical for the Orthodox Jews in Ramapo. Ramapo’s
zoning code allowed such structures only on plots of at least two
acres. Building such a synagogue “would cost as much as $750,000,
an expenditure that would require the support of approximately 150
families,” many more than the small cluster of Orthodox families
that had moved to Ramapo.71 Instead, Ramapo accommodated the
Orthodox congregation with a favorable interpretation of its zoning
provision for home professional offices (“HPOs”). The provision
permits certain professionals, including clergy, to operate offices in
the home. In the mid-1980s, Ramapo interpreted this HPO provision as permitting home synagogues (“shteebles”) that enabled rabbis

69. See Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 417-18.
70. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 417-18.
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to conduct religious services in their homes for groups of up to
forty-nine individuals.72
b. The village’s exclusionary moves. However, certain residents of
Ramapo’s Airmont section opposed this and other zoning accommodations that could encourage immigration of Orthodox Jews.73
These residents formed the Airmont Civic Association, Inc. (“ACA”)
which advocated the incorporation of the Airmont section into a village that could adopt its own zoning code. The ACA vigorously opposed any further zoning accommodations, such as granting Rabbi
Sternberg’s application to conduct worship services in his home.
ACA members “posted themselves outside of Rabbi Sternberg’s
home to count the arriving congregants; [one ACA leader] at other
times parked in front of the homes of other Orthodox Jews during
their prayer times.”74 The ACA’s campaign for incorporation underscored, as its primary purpose, the “desire to keep the Orthodox and
Hasidic Jews out.”75 One statement promulgated by ACA leaders
bristled at the prospect of cohabitating with “‘a bunch of people
who insist on living in the past. I am not prejudice [sic] in any way,
shape or form but i [sic] will not have a hasidic community in my
backyard.’”76 The public vote for incorporation passed by a three-toone margin, and the Village of Airmont was formally incorporated in
April 1991. A village trustee stated that now “there are other ways
we can harass them.”77 Two days later, the plaintiffs filed suit.
In January 1993, the Village of Airmont enacted its own zoning
code, which rewrote Ramapo’s accommodating HPO provision. The
Airmont version demanded that the HPO be only “incidental and
secondary to the use . . . for dwelling” and “shall not generate activities that come into a residential area so as to detract from the residential character of the area.”78 The village reserved to itself the discretion of interpretation: “Any aggrieved person shall apply to the

72. Id.
73. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
74. Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 420.
75. Id. at 418.
76. Id. at 419.
77. Id. at 420.
78. Id. (quoting VILLAGE OF AIRMONT, N.Y., ZONING CODE, art. XVIII(2) (emphasis
omitted)).
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Zoning Board of Appeals for an interpretation as to whether or not a
proposed activity or use” is a permissible HPO.79
Though the Village of Airmont’s zoning code had not yet been
applied against its Orthodox Jews (Rabbi Sternberg’s zoning accommodation application was eventually granted), the Village of
Airmont’s mayor and three of its four trustees opposed an interpretation of the HPO provision that allowed worship services in clergy
homes. Evidence suggested the zoning concerns of the trustees and
the ACA were “selective, focusing only on Orthodox [home] synagogues” and their handful of pious pedestrians as sources of “traffic
or noise.”80 During this same period, the village ignored the actual
traffic and noise of a local country club, described by one witness as
“‘a total nightmare.’”81 Similarly, it unanimously approved a variance
to accommodate a too-tall Catholic spire, with one trustee advocating the approval “‘because this is the Catholic church [sic] that
wants it.’”82
2. History in the lower court
Bringing suit in the Southern District of New York, Rabbi
Sternberg spearheaded an action by several Orthodox Jews against
the Village of Airmont and its leading officers, both individually and
in their official capacity. The United States Attorney filed a parallel
action (the two were later joined), similarly alleging that the defendants’ acts violated the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause and the
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). At trial, the jury found for the individual defendants but found the village had violated the plaintiffs’ Free
Exercise and FHA rights.83 However, the jury awarded no damages.
The district judge set aside the jury’s verdict against the village, finding it inconsistent with an award of no damages, and denied the
plaintiffs any relief against the Village of Airmont.84

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 421.
Id. (quoting from Trial Transcript at 5335).
Id. (quoting from Trial Transcript at 3025).
See id. at 422.
See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 846 F.Supp. 294, 295 (1994).
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3. The Second Circuit’s ruling
On appeal, in 1995, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court’s rulings regarding the FHA and Free Exercise claims against
the village, reinstating the jury’s verdict.85 It remanded the case with
an order for injunctive relief and nominal damages for the plaintiffs.
The court affirmed the dismissal of the private plaintiffs’ claims
against the individual defendants.
The court rehearsed how the First Amendment, by incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment, bars the states from prohibiting the free exercise of religion.86 Referencing the fresh ruling in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the court
recognized that
it is unclear to what extent this prohibition requires states affirmatively to accommodate religious practice . . . [but] it is firmly established that “‘if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law . . . is invalid
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to advance that interest . . . .’ [A] law targeting religious beliefs as
such is never permissible.”87

Finding the jury’s verdict (that a desire to impede religious exercise did motivate the ordinance) “fully supportable” by the evidence,
the court reinstated the verdict and invalidated the ordinance.88 Because “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time, constitutes irreparable injury,”89 the court noted that a
victim can have standing before the actual injury occurs. The court
explained that Free Exercise violations can also trigger causes of action under federal civil rights law.90 Besides the Free Exercise claim,
the Second Circuit elaborated on why the evidence supported the
verdict that the village had violated the FHA.91
85. See Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 429.
86. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
87. Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 426 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).
88. Id. at 429.
89. Id. at 426.
90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1999).
91. Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a) (1999). The FHA’s prohibitions extend to discriminatory zoning restrictions as an
unlawful method of “otherwise mak[ing] unavailable” housing. NAACP v. Town of Hunting-
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B. Round Two: Comprehensive Injunctive Relief

On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court ordered
three forms of injunctive relief. First, the court entered a prohibitory
injunction enjoining the village from: (1) promoting religious discrimination; (2) denying equal protection to religions by use, interpretation, or enforcement of the zoning code; and (3) discriminating
in housing based on religion, or interfering with the exercise of religion through housing. Second, the court entered a mandatory injunction requiring the village to revise its zoning code so that it could
not be construed to prevent home worship, or to prevent persons
from walking to and from places of religious worship. The court specifically called for an addition to [the Village of Airmont’s] zoning
code entitled “Residential Place of Worship.” Such places were defined as “areas located within a residence that is used for the conducting of religious services.” The order provided that such places
“will be permitted by right on any day in all residential zones.”
Third, the court entered a mandatory injunction regarding notification and the retention of documents. The village was ordered to
keep all documents related to zoning decisions, and notify the government of any such decisions, or of any meetings of planning or
zoning boards at which applications touching on religious worship
would be presented.92
In its appeal to the Second Circuit (Fletcher II), the Village of
Airmont faulted the mandatory injunction for three reasons.93 It
viewed the injunction as: (1) disproportionate because the violation
ton, 844 F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). Any aggrieved person has standing to sue, even if injury by a discriminatory housing practice is prospective, as long as the aggrieved believes that such injury is about to occur. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1999). Using a
theory of disparate treatment, a plaintiff can establish an FHA violation by demonstrating that
“animus against the protected group ‘was a significant factor in the position taken’ by the municipal decision-makers . . . .” Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Yonkers Bd.
of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1217, 1223, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055
(1988)). “Discriminatory intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances . . . .”
Id.
92. See Fletcher II, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31800, at *4-5 (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg
v. Fletcher, 922 F. Supp. 959, 964-65 & n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
93. The village relied upon the criteria set forth in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267
(1977). The Supreme Court directed courts to consider three factors: (1) the remedy must be
“determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,” (2) the injunction must
be remedial in nature, i.e. restore the victims to the position they would have occupied but for
the discriminatory conduct, and (3) the remedy must respect the role of state and local authorities in the management of their affairs. Id. at 280-81.
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found by the court was merely predictive, and not existing; (2) not
remedial; and (3) a judicial usurpation of the power of local government to modify the zoning regulations.
The Second Circuit rejected these three arguments. First, the
court ruled that the village had already violated the plaintiffs’ rights
by passing a zoning code based on religious animus. The village’s
“egregious constitutional violation” called for a remedy that “cured
the past constitutional violation and obviated the threat of future
constitutional violations.”94 Second, the court reasoned that a prospective order can also be remedial because such orders may be necessary to ensure future compliance.95 The injunction on the village
“ensured that rights to free exercise of religion were unencumbered,
and the constant threat of limitation of those rights was lifted.”96
Third, the court acknowledged that it had previously urged federal
courts to defer initially to “a state’s ability to remedy constitutional
deficiencies” itself.97 However, in this case, considering the village’s
raison d’être and the finding that future violations were “likely,” the
court found “no indication that the Village was going to make the
changes necessary” to guarantee constitutional compliance.98
C. Round Three: What “Winning” Means
After receiving the injunctive relief affirmed by the Second Circuit, the private plaintiffs moved for an award of costs and attorneys’
fees against the village (Fletcher III). Surprisingly, the same district
court judge who had granted the plaintiffs the three injunctions

94. Fletcher II, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31800 at *9 (emphasis added).
95. See id. at *11.
96. Id. at *12.
97. Id. (describing the holding in Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 213 (2d. Cir.
1986)).
98. Id. at *12-13. The Second Circuit defended the extent of the relief generally by citing Supreme Court pronouncements that grant broad latitude in crafting an injunction. It is “a
balancing process left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) (citing Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)). The remedy must “so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future.” Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). In fact, the Supreme Court
had already approved a previous ruling by the Second Circuit in which the court specifically
ordered revisions to a municipality’s zoning code to secure its compliance with civil rights under the Constitution. See NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488
U.S. 15 (1988).
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found that the plaintiffs had not met the “prevailing party” standard,
and thus denied the motion.99
In Fletcher III in 1998, the Second Circuit ruled for the appealing plaintiffs, reversing and remanding the case for a calculation of
their award.100 It reasoned that the established violations of plaintiffs’
rights and their injunctive relief satisfied the prevailing party standard. The court found that the district judge “seriously understated
the significance of the injunction.”101 Though the Orthodox Jewish
plaintiffs had not yet been prevented from worshiping in their
homes, “the injunction removed a substantial threat of such interference.”102 The district judge himself acknowledged that the changes
ordered in the village’s zoning code “‘may be helpful to any new religious groups that desire to hold services in a private home in a residential area.’”103 In remanding for calculation, the court reminded
the district judge that the purpose of this award is “‘to encourage the
bringing of meritorious civil rights claims which might otherwise be
abandoned because of the financial imperatives . . . .’”104
D. Round Four? Prospective Prohibitions
Since Fletcher III, the Second Circuit has made no further rulings on the Airmont “home synagogue” controversy. But it may yet
get another chance. The Orthodox Jews of Airmont Village have applied to build a very large home synagogue, “designed to accommodate hundreds of people on a regular basis.”105 The space inside the
proposed 16,580 square-foot structure would be split between residential and “devotional” uses, making it “larger by far than all but a
very few residential dwellings and also larger than many free-standing
99. The judge reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed against all defendants except the
village and had not secured the “major relief” (damages) that they sought. Fletcher III, 143
F.3d at 751 (reviewing the district court’s reasons).
100. See id. Subsequently, the district judge balked at this order and requested instead
that the remanded case be transferred to another judge on the district court bench. See Mark
Hamblett, Judge Balks at Order from 2d Circuit Panel; Calculation of Counsel Fees is Reassigned, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1998, at 1 col. 5.
101. Fletcher III, 143 F.3d at 759.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 760 (quoting the district court’s unpublished memorandum decision of October 15, 1996, denying attorneys’ fees).
104. Id. at 763 (quoting Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982)).
105. Village of Airmont v. United States, No. 98-3801, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2376, at
*1, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1999).
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houses of worship.”106 Characterizing this application as an “unexpected development,” the village has expressed a desire to add restrictions to its zoning code to limit such structures.107 Last year, the
district court declined to grant the village advance approval of contemplated amendments to the village’s zoning code.108 The court invoked both a lack of jurisdiction (the United States—the defendant
in the declaratory action—had not consented to be sued) and the
general prohibition on advisory opinions, and thus dismissed the suit
without reaching the merits.109
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Part assesses the Second Circuit’s reasoning regarding the
Free Exercise claim in Fletcher I. It then analyzes the impact of the
court’s three Fletcher holdings on this area of law. Lastly, it proposes
several measures to reconcile the rights of religious exercise with the
legitimate interests of local governmental administration.
A. Assessing the Court’s Resolution
The Second Circuit properly reinstated the verdict in Fletcher I
that found violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the Free Exercise
Clause and the FHA. On the Free Exercise claim, the court safely relied on the recent Lukumi precedent, which struck down an ordinance motivated by religious animus that targeted the religious worship of a particular group.110 The consistency and unanimity of the
Second Circuit’s decisions through this decade-long controversy
sends a strong warning to those municipalities contemplating exclusionary zoning ordinances. Though the composition of the threejudge panel changed in each round of litigation, all three rulings favored the Orthodox Jewish plaintiffs and all three were unanimous
decisions.
The court did not elaborate, however, on the proper standard for
determining impermissible religious animus. Specifically, it failed to
explain how much animus constitutes a “significant factor” and
which sources of animus are impermissible. Judging from the facts it
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

1170

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
See id. at *1.
See id. at *7.
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520.
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chose to highlight, the court gave serious weight to the defendants’
individual history, before they became village officials, of unabashed
civic agitation against the Orthodox Jewish community. But it is unclear whether a public official’s prior activism and intent can always
be imputed to his subsequent official acts that appear facially neutral.
The Fletcher I court’s willingness to probe the factual record à la Lukumi to ascertain motive suggests that the aggregation of these motives—even if they are expressed unofficially, as here—have significant weight in the scales of decision. On the other hand, perhaps few
cases will contain a record of animus as clear as Fletcher.111 Without
such a convincing record of ill intent, courts will likely find intent to
be “neutral” and burdens on religion “incidental,” and thus permissible.
B. Impact of the Court’s Decisions on the Law
The results of the Fletcher decisions suggest a modest but significant victory for advocates of religious liberty. It is modest because
the holding may be limited to situations in which religious animus
clearly motivates the challenged state action. It is significant because
the Second Circuit reinforced two principles that aid churches with
Free Exercise claims. First, it indicated that the right of Free Exercise
contains a locational component, though courts have not traditionally
so held.112 Second, the strong set of judicial remedies applied may
enhance the ability of other religious organizations, especially home
worshippers, to obtain redress.
1. The right to Free Exercise: a locational component
In recent decades, courts deciding religious land use cases have
“ignore[d] the reality that property and religious exercise are inextricably linked,”113 even though the “right to create [physical] worship
space” is arguably a “core First Amendment right.”114 Zoning ordinances are generally permitted to exclude a church “as long as an ‘al-

111. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 251 (1996).
112. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 21.
113. Id. at 19. Property used for religious purposes “becomes an extension and embodiment of religious exercise [and] [t]he relationship between property and religion is thus a close
one. But many courts miss this link.” Carmella, supra note 42, at 584.
114. Laycock, supra note 40, at 758.
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ternative location’ is legally possible” and the discrimination is not
overt.115 Thus, worship in a particular location is typically not seen
as inherent to religious freedom.116 For example, one group for
whom particular sacred locations have always been integral to religious exercise is Native Americans. Yet they have suffered from a
“pattern of lower-court rulings against free exercise claims by [Native
Americans] relating to government land use,”117 capped by the Supreme Court’s major adverse ruling in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association.118
In Fletcher, however, the Second Circuit connected the location
of worship with the right of Free Exercise. To give meaning to the
Orthodox Jews’ right to worship in Airmont, the injunction located
that right in a rabbi’s home. This sets a useful precedent for religious
organizations whose religious exercise relates closely to location.
Perhaps few groups share the quorum and transportation mandates
of Orthodox Jewry. But the link between favorable locations and the
vibrancy of religious activity conceivably affects many churches for
whom frequent congregating and close community living are an exercise of faith.
This precedent, that religious exercise has a locational component, may improve the geographic mobility of believers from one
neighborhood to another. In the instant case, it will likely undo the
ACA’s chilling effect on Jewish immigration from the village’s hostility.119 Now the religious rights of prospective residents of Airmont
seem far more secure. This reassurance matters immensely to closeknit minority religions, because “in the absence of a willingness on
the pa[rt] of local communities to accommodate the needs of Orthodox Jews for local houses of worship, [an Orthodox] community
will be effectively locked out of many neighborhoods across this

115. CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 20.
116. See id.
117. Lupu, supra note 63, at 946 n.56.
118. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that burdens on Free Exercise imposed by logging
activities in particular areas sacred to Native Americans do not require compelling governmental interest, because they only inhibit religious practices rather than coerce individuals into acting contrary to their beliefs). See also Ammoneta Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that constructing a dam that would flood certain sites and
cemeteries sacred to Native Americans was not a constitutionally cognizable infringement on
Free Exercise).
119. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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great land.”120 Recent decades have generated a pattern of “ostensibly neutral land use laws” that burden the Jewish religion “by not
allowing Jews to worship within close proximity to where they
live.”121 Thus, the court’s change of the Village of Airmont’s code
has sent ripples across a debate with far-reaching demographic ramifications.122
Orthodox Judaism’s demanding standards render it particularly
vulnerable to hostility in suburbs such as the Village of Airmont. But
other religious groups similarly suffer from exclusionary neighbors.
“Towns have overwhelmingly used zoning laws to prevent minority
denominations from locating in their communities.”123 As Airmont’s
Orthodox Jews have learned, these exclusionary impulses are compounded if membership in a given church also connotes an ethnic
identity. For example, the zoning authorities of Wayne, New Jersey,
denied a permit to a black church because of one town official’s vocal opposition, fearing a racial transformation of the neighborhood.124 Officials in Clifton, New Jersey, denied permits to a “black”
mosque four times, citing parking problems; but later, they approved
a “white” church nearby that presented identical parking concerns.125
Similarly, zoning officials manipulated parking rules to effectively exclude any mosque from a Mississippi community in Islamic Center v.
City of Starkville.126
The Second Circuit’s invalidation of the Airmont Village ordinance in Fletcher I runs counter to the trend in federal jurisprudence.
Courts typically defer to a municipality’s restrictions on church locations, as long as the restrictions fall short of outright prohibition and
an alternative location for the church theoretically exists, even if the
120. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, June 23, 1998 (statement of David Zwiebel, general counsel for Agudath Israel of America, the nation’s largest grassroots Orthodox Jewish organization) available in
LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter Zwiebel Statement].
121. Id.
122. See Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as amicus curiae in Support of Respondents at app., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074)
[hereinafter LDS Church Amicus Brief]. The brief’s appended statistical survey reveals that
smaller churches must fight much harder than mainline churches to secure accommodation
under zoning codes.
123. Rebecca Beynon, Regulation of Church Land Use and Discrimination Against Minority Faiths 46 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
124. See Laycock, supra note 40, at 781.
125. See id.
126. 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
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alternative is impractical or financially prohibitive.127 But because the
Fletcher case contained an unusually clear intent to discriminate,128
the Second Circuit’s holding alone may not reverse that trend, and
may be limited to cases with similarly compelling facts.
2. Enhanced remedies: extensive injunctions and attorneys’ fees
In Fletcher II and Fletcher III, the Second Circuit employed two
powerful remedies in granting relief to the plaintiffs. This precedent
may enhance the ability of future Free Exercise claimants to obtain
relief. The court both narrowed the Village of Airmont’s zoning discretion and relieved the plaintiffs of the onerous burden of attorneys’
fees and costs.
a. Injunctive relief. The set of injunctions upheld in Fletcher II
sharply curtailed the village’s discretion in zoning decisions affecting
religious exercise. Previously, the sword of Damocles dangled above
the home worship meetings, hanging by the thread of village discretion. The court responded vigorously. The specificity of the injunctive relief should encourage advocates of religious liberty. Even
though zoning is traditionally a local function, this federal court
found that extensive intervention was justified. Even before Airmont
Village abused its discretion, the injunctions rewrote portions of the
zoning code, mandated that the zoning authorities construe certain
provisions as permitting home worship, and put the board under judicial surveillance.
This remedy pinpoints the true danger for religious minorities in
land use disputes: the wide (and easily abused) discretion that municipal zoning authorities enjoy, both in how rules are made and in
how they are applied. A typical zoning board’s level of discretion allows judgments that are so subjective that “[i]n the free speech context, we would call this standardless licensing, and it would be unconstitutional.”129 Land use regulation “is administered through
highly discretionary and individualized processes that leave ample
room for deliberate but hidden discrimination, and where there is
substantial evidence of widespread hostility to non-mainstream
churches and some hostility to all churches.”130 Moreover, if zoning
127.
128.
129.
130.
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boards, which are naturally sensitive to majoritarian pressures, reject
the minority church’s request, the church may have no effective recourse.131
In Smith, the Supreme Court worried that conditioning “an individual’s obligation to obey [a generally applicable] law” upon the
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs allows the beliefmotivated individual “‘to become a law unto himself.’”132 A society
of laws could simply not tolerate this result. But permitting the multitude of local zoning boards to reach decisions—without objective
justification or effective oversight—permits them to become a law
unto themselves.
The epilogue to the Second Circuit’s three rulings hints at the
risks of aggressive injunctive intervention. It may handcuff local officials. The court’s remedy was so protective of home worship that the
Orthodox Jews planned an enormous home-synagogue. Since the
district court refused to approve in advance the village’s contemplated restrictions, the village acts at its peril. If it wishes to enact
even a reasonable measure limiting an Orthodox super synagogue,
the village apparently must bear the full risk of judicial penalty if the
court later finds the measure discriminatory. How many municipalities could afford that risk? How many well-intentioned and needful
decisions will a municipality forego for fear of being misunderstood
by a court?
On the other hand, a huge home synagogue seems a natural consequence of the village’s hostility. Remembering the village’s past intimidation, the Orthodox Jews may reasonably expect the village to
deny site approval for a free-standing synagogue. Meanwhile, this
planned home synagogue capitalizes on the one thing the Orthodox
now know they can do in Airmont—worship in their homes. Why
not build what they can before the village bureaucracy regains the
upper hand? Moreover, given the practical difficulties of the residential real estate market, the hope of “locat[ing] a church in built-up

Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 1, 1997 (statement by Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of
Texas Law School) available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File.
131. In some state zoning acts, there are no provisions for judicial review of decisions by
local government bodies that administer zoning ordinances. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAW § 8.11, at 326 (2d ed. 1988).
132. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878)).
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residential neighborhoods is illusory for all but . . . congregations
[that] can meet in a single house.”133
b. Award of attorneys’ fees. The award of attorneys’ fees and costs
in Fletcher III demonstrated the court’s proper understanding of
what home-worship plaintiffs are really seeking. The court’s interpretation of prevailing party recognized that the liberty interests redeemed by injunction far outweigh the failed claims for damages.
Evidently, the court shared the view of Rabbi Sternberg’s attorney
that “the case ‘was about the right to pray and not about
money.’”134 Like Rabbi Sternberg, plaintiffs who care more about
freedom than damages—which is highly probable in lawsuits about
religious exercise—are now more likely to be classified as prevailing
parties and thus deserving of attorneys’ fees if they secure at least injunctive relief.
The legal representation that rallied to the cause of the Orthodox
Jews in the Village of Airmont indicates that they had powerful
friends.135 This court’s standard for awarding attorneys’ fees bodes
well for churches with less powerful allies. It particularly favors small,
minority churches in a crucial and practical way. A formidable study
shows why they need this help.136 It is smaller churches that are more
often the subject of discriminatory zoning practices. Though minority churches represent only nine percent of the population, they are
embroiled in half the lawsuits involving zoning and churches.137
Once in court, interestingly, their rates of success approximate those
of larger churches.138 Even larger churches seem “more vulnerable
than other projects of similar size to NIMBY139 opposition” because
“any one church may have only a few potential members in the immediate neighborhood,”140 with the rest of its congregation spread
out in various municipalities.
133. Laycock, supra note 40, at 761.
134. Hamblett, supra note 100, at 1 col. 5 (quoting Manhattan attorney Alan J. Straus).
135. The Attorney General of the State of New York, the Anti-Defamation League of
B’nai B’rith, Agudath Israel of America, and the Rutherford Institute each filed an amicus curiae brief for the Orthodox and Government plaintiffs. See Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 412.
136. See supra note 122.
137. See LDS Church Amicus Brief, supra note 122, at A-5.
138. See id. at A-7.
139. In public policy parlance, an acronym for a community’s opposition to a proposed
project: “not in my backyard.”
140. Laycock, supra note 40, at 759 (explaining why virtually any church’s members find
themselves in a distinct minority in their municipality).
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Even these startling statistics understate the problem. The expense of litigation often prevents many churches from filing suit.
Most small churches “bend over backwards to avoid conflicts with
future neighbors and city officials they must deal with on a continuing basis[,] . . . giv[ing] up on claims they may believe are valid in
the interest of social peace.”141 It is not known how many incidents
of discrimination go legally unchallenged because smaller churches
cannot fund a fight. The prevailing party standard in Fletcher III
would empower smaller churches with a promising equitable claim
to seek redress in the courts. A readiness by courts to award attorneys’ fees to a successful claimant would avoid the dilemma churches
often face: suffering unconstitutional restraints or delving into the
collection basket to fund uncertain litigation.
C. Recommendations for Moderate Protections
The recommendations below aim to enhance the protection of
Free Exercise rights while fairly esteeming the interests of local governments in land use planning. They seek to improve the legislation
and the standards which courts apply to resolve religious land use
cases.
1. Narrow the discretion of zoning boards
a. Shift the burden of justification back onto governmental bodies.
The level of discretion enjoyed by zoning boards varies widely
among and within jurisdictions, and broad discretion threatens religious liberty. The law should protect religious exercise against substantial burdens by shifting the responsibility of justifying such burdens to the zoning boards.
How heavy should this burden of justification be? The RLPA bill
retains the strict-scrutiny standard for governmental action that
“substantially burden[s]” religious exercise.142 But the burden of justification need not be that heavy to be effective; it need only place
some responsibility on municipalities to effect a profound increase in
Free Exercise protection. For example, the law could establish a “re141. The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on House Bill 4019/1308 Before
the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 134 (1998)
(statement by W. Cole Durham, Jr., Professor, Brigham Young University Law School) [hereinafter Durham Statement].
142. See 105 H.R. 4019, § 2(b) (1998).
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buttable presumption” that governmental burdens (direct or incidental143) on religious exercise are invalid, or it could subject a municipality’s reasons for an ordinance to greater—perhaps “heightened”—scrutiny, requiring a showing that the regulation “advance[]
an important . . . governmental purpose.”144 Either approach would
alter the balance by removing governmental bureaucracy’s chief advantages: inertia and indifference. If the burden of justification rests
with that bureaucracy, then neither bureaucratic inertia nor indifference could crush a religious exercise claimant.
A heightened scrutiny standard, located somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny, may be difficult to calibrate precisely,
but it is workable.145 For example, RLPA’s land use provision requires the government to justify any regulation that “substantially
burdens” religious exercise with a showing of “substantial and tangible harm” to the community. A heightened standard would be most
effective at the extremes, validating significant governmental reasons
and exposing pretextual ones, like the Village of Airmont’s reasoning
that Orthodox Jews—doctrinally bound to walk reverently to services—are a source of traffic and noise. Thus courts could balance interests, but with a modest burden of persuasion on the municipality.
Shifting the burden of justification away from churches and onto
a municipal bureaucracy (with its potentially large public resources)
will cause even well-intentioned zoning boards to weigh more cautiously, and tailor more closely, proposals that may burden religious
exercise. The frequent “approximation and imprecision” of zoning
regulations “may interfere with religious exercise without furthering
any municipal interest.”146 Shifting the presumption will yield Parato
optimality,147 where otherwise zoning boards could remain insulated
143. See Dorf, supra note 64, at 1199 (contending that the law should recognize certain
incidental burdens as “infringements of constitutional rights” and therefore subject to some
form of heightened scrutiny).
144. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 139 (emphasis added).
145. See Dorf, supra note 64, at 1199-1200 (discussing various models for approaching
incidental burdens and concluding the “best options” apply some form of heightened or strict
scrutiny to certain incidental burdens).
146. Carmella, supra note 42, at 575.
147. In economic theory, Parato optimality is an arrangement by which each side has
moved to a point where any further increase in utility for one party will necessarily decrease the
other’s utility. The theory is best understood in terms of indifference curves. It recognizes that,
if parties have differing values, after party X achieves a certain level of utility, party Y may still
increase its utility by shifts to which party X is indifferent, until the shifting reaches the point of
Parato optimality. For purposes of this discussion, a church’s religious goals presumably differ
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and indifferent to the incidental or unintended consequences of their
regulations.
b. Courts should probe for threats to religious exercise. Courts
should probe for discriminatory intent, rather than deferring to municipal decisions, whenever intentional threats to fundamental rights
such as Free Exercise are suspected from the record. Admittedly, discerning motive may prove too difficult at times, as “courts are often
reluctant to attribute the collective decision” to the expressed discriminatory motive of individual policy-makers.148 As the historic defender of the out-voted minority, courts have an affirmative duty to
protect fundamental liberties, despite Smith’s apparent abdication of
such responsibility for Free Exercise. Otherwise, the noble guarantees of liberty in law will fade into the majority’s discretionary preferences and prejudices. “Of our public decision-making practices, only
adjudication imposes obligations to decide and give public reasons
for the decision,”149 which makes courts—and their ability to require
governmental bodies to give public reasons—indispensable to the
protection of religious exercise.
As it minimized the judiciary’s role regarding Free Exercise, the
majority in Smith admitted that “leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable
consequence of democratic government.”150 In subsequent testimony before Congress, an expert responded that “[f]rankly, that had
not been our understanding. We had always thought that the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights were designed to protect the
vulnerable minority from the tyrannical majority.”151 Vulnerable to
the discretion of zoning boards, religious minorities need the affirmative protection of a court that can request that municipalities
publicly justify the burdens they impose.

from a municipality’s goals (e.g., health and safety). Often, a town can maintain its desired
level of health and safety and still allow a church certain shifts that increase its religious exercise. This shifting, however, requires municipal sensitivity; a town unaccountable for the incidental burdens it imposes will lack incentives to accommodate a church.
148. Laycock 1999 Senate Statement, supra note 29.
149. Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 593 (1998).
See id. (assessing reasons for judicial hesitancy regarding religious exemptions).
150. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
151. Zwiebel Statement, supra note 120.
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c. Legislatures should compile a record of zoning discrimination
against religious exercise. Though the Supreme Court in Boerne invalidated RFRA as overreaching, none of the Court’s precedents
suggest “that there is anything improper about the congressional objective of protecting religious freedom beyond the constitutional
minimum.”152 In Boerne, the Court agreed that Congress may regulate government practices which “have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.”153 The high risk of purposeful discrimination
in zoning decisions arguably makes these “government practices” a
deserving target of legislation. For example, Congress could
heighten scrutiny by declaring “presumptively unlawful all governmental practices in these areas [including land use] that can be
proven in litigation to have a substantially discriminatory effect on
religion.”154
At minimum, legislative attempts to protect religious freedom
must, like RLPA, learn the lessons of Boerne. They must respect the
Supreme Court’s historical prerogative of constitutional interpretation; invoke firm constitutional authority; and compile a more comprehensive record of the Free Exercise violations that necessitate legislative redress. Such legislation must also respect federalism’s
restraints. RLPA, for instance, has been promoted as “not a bill to
regulate the states; it is a bill to deregulate religion.”155 Federal overprotection of religious exercise would prove counterproductive, even
for religious interests. Religious “excesses” far greater than a 16,580
square-foot home synagogue could proliferate, beyond the reach of a
municipality’s sensible regulation. If legislation narrows municipal
zoning discretion too much, it increases the incentives for municipalities to fight harder to exclude churches entirely at the outset,
fearful that once new churches become entrenched, they would be
immune from local control.156
2. Judges and litigants should avoid the hybrid rights approach
Governmental action that abridges Free Exercise often tears at a
web of rights—equal protection, due process, free speech, or free as-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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sembly.157 While noting the other fundamental rights implicated in a
given Free Exercise claim may illuminate the issues, judges and litigants should avoid the “hybrid rights” characterization offered in
Smith, which reasoned that burdens on Free Exercise do warrant
strict scrutiny if they infringe on at least one other fundamental
right.
Indeed, the right of Free Exercise will often be bound up with
other rights. In Fletcher I, the ordinance violated individual rights on
two independent grounds: Free Exercise, and equal protection rights
under FHA. In a land use case in the Tenth Circuit, a dissenting
judge expounded on this strong connection among fundamental
rights in the religion context.158 Places of worship should enjoy protection under the First Amendment “not only because housed worship has been historically central to religion but also because such activities necessarily involve speech and assembly.”159 Because a house
of worship is usually the only place of religious assembly and the central place for the expression of religious speech, courts should scrutinize ordinances inhibiting houses of worship as strictly as speech and
assembly ordinances.
But lumping Free Exercise in with other fundamental rights
poses an insidious threat to religious exercise. Lamentably, Smith’s
hybrid rights approach yields ironic incentives for Free Exercise
claimants. It lures the Free Exercise plaintiff to attempt to trigger
strict scrutiny by adding related fundamental rights to create a multipillared hybrid claim. This capitulates to Smith’s characterization of
Free Exercise as a dependent right, incapable of triggering strict scrutiny on its own. This conceptualization of Free Exercise as an inferior
right will degrade religious liberty. Upholding religious freedom by
reliance on clauses other than Free Exercise will distort the law. The
Founders wrote no second tier into the First Amendment for not-sofundamental rights. For those claims that happen to implicate no
other fundamental right, Free Exercise should stand alone as defense
enough.
The danger that Free Exercise will degrade into a dependent
right is real. One prominent view among scholars characterizes

157. See Wehener, supra note 34, at 511.
158. See Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 831 (10th Cir.
1988) (McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
159. Id.
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church-state jurisprudence as the product of competition between an
equality paradigm and a liberty paradigm.160 “Equality rights generally prevent government from imposing a burden on one person
unless it imposes the burden on everyone. Liberty rights generally
prevent the state from imposing the burden at all, even if it imposes
it on everyone.”161 The central, foreboding feature of the post-Smith
era seems to be that the “significance of religious freedom is being
eroded by the ascendancy of the equality paradigm over the liberty
paradigm in legal thought.”162 Rather than adopt a robust, libertyoriented conception of Free Exercise, “[c]ourts seem especially uncomfortable with claims of religious exemption” for reasons inherent
to religion.163
The courts should not interpret Free Exercise as anything less
than it was meant to be, as Justice O’Connor argues in her dissent in
Boerne. She warns that
the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that single out religious
practice for unfavorable treatment . . . . Rather, the Clause is best
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in
religious practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral,
generally applicable law.164

This perspective properly interprets Free Exercise as an essential
element of liberty, not a principle of equality. The equality standard
is simply inappropriate because nothing is quite like religion. It has
merited special protection since the Pilgrims.
Whatever one ultimately thinks about the balance of liberty and
equality, it is fair to say that the greatness of our tradition in religious liberty will be impoverished if we do not understand that at
its core it is about the protection of religious differences, religious
pluralism, and religious conscience, and that sometimes the values

160. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 670-76 (1999); see generally Carmella, supra note 42.
161. Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 568 (1998).
162. Durham, supra note 160, at 670.
163. Lupu, supra note 149, at 593; see generally Gedicks, supra note 161.
164. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 546 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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are so strong that they even override otherwise relevant equality
claims.165

Churches play a role in society unlike their fellow plaintiffs in land
use disputes: shopping malls, liquor stores, and adult dance clubs.
Their unquantifiable but unmistakable social value deserves special
weight in the scales of justice and the corridors of policy. This is ever
more urgent as municipalities face mounting obstacles to protecting
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their residents.
V. CONCLUSION
The fundamental questions of the Free Exercise debate focus on
the proper scope of religious exercise and how to balance it against
contrary governmental interests. In the land use context, the courts
have adopted divergent approaches in analyzing how much the Constitution protects religious exercise from burdens imposed by zoning
ordinances. The Second Circuit’s decisions in LeBlanc-Sternberg v.
Fletcher presented a modest but significant victory for religious exercise. The court demonstrated that location is an integral aspect of religious exercise. Its comprehensive injunctive remedy suggested a
greater affirmative duty on the court to protect religion. As one of
only three federal circuit rulings on home worship, this precedent
should assist other small religious groups seeking to defend this
right. The award of attorneys’ fees for winning injunctive relief may
embolden smaller religious groups to demand constitutional protection in court.
This legal controversy bears enormous importance beyond the
courtroom. It influences how we build and manage and belong to
our own communities in America. It relates to an individual’s rights
within his home and neighborhood. It asks whether the law can effectively protect those individuals whom a community wishes to exclude because of their faith. In short, it affects how we treat those
who are our neighbors.
Religious freedom has no secular analogue. Its significance to
liberty warrants special protection. For persons of faith, religious liberty is of unique importance—for many, of ultimate importance—
and thus “important enough to die for, to suffer for, to rebel for, to

165. Durham Statement, supra note 141, at 134.
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emigrate for, to fight to control the government for.”166 It cannot be
understood merely through association with other fundamental
rights. It requires the affirmative protection of legislatures and courts
against the discretion of zoning authorities.
The Founders listed religious liberty as the first freedom of the
Republic. The right to worship freely in homes and in public locations is an article of faith in America. The positive social value of religious organizations deserves the law’s reconsideration. As municipalities increasingly struggle to protect the health, safety, and morals
of their residents, courts, and legislatures would do well to consider
whether vibrant religious communities and favorably-located
churches are not powerful and natural allies to these salutary public
interests.
John M. Smith

166. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 317 (1996).
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